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Abstract: The veiled woman troubles feminism and secularism in much the 
same way. Both feminism and secularism face a problem of finding a 
position that respects individual autonomy, and simultaneously 
sustains a conception of politics freed from heteronomous 
determination. This article gives an account of what is being resisted 
and by whom in modes of politics which seek to produce an 
autonomous subject emancipated from `other laws' (heteronomy). It 
also draws on Jean-Luc Nancy in order to consider what has been 
termed the problem of Islam in Europe as a wider juridical and 
political problem centred on the significance of affect as heteronomy. 
It thus explores the tension between piety and polity.  





Ministers of state and the Prime Minister of Britain have found a problem 
worthy of themselves.1 Not just the emancipation of women but social 
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1 For a similar account in relation to France, see A. Badiou's excellent reflection in `The 
Law of the Islamic Headscarf' in his Polemics (2006) at 98-114. A sample of the 
statements by ministers and the Prime Minister about veiled Muslim women can be 
found in an excellent review of events and press coverage by Wendy Kristianasen, 
`Britain's Multiculturalism Falters' in Le Monde diplomatique, November 2006. Ishah 
Azmi, a school teacher in Dewsbury, Yorkshire, who wore a nikab in the classroom 
ceased to be a worker whose rights should have been determined by an employment 
tribunal without politicians expressing their judgement before all legal processes were 
expended. The minister for race and faith, Phil Woolas, told the Sunday Mirror on 15 
October that `she should be sacked. She has put herself in a position where she can't do 
her job'. Her own MP, Shahid Malik, urged her not to pursue an appeal. Harriet 
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cohesion, even democracy itself, depends on their success. In France the 
hijab and other religious symbols have been outlawed in educational 
institutions. Muslim girls and women are to be saved from their fathers and 
brothers. These girls and women must show their hair and faces, for surely to 
think that the decision to `veil' is a matter of autonomous choice, an exercise 
of freedom of conscience or religion long guaranteed by liberal juridical 
orders is nothing but `false consciousness'. What is the reason for this rage 
against a few girls and women who wear headscarves or other forms of 
Islamic dress? What is behind this insistence that the woman, and especially 
the girl, must disrobe, must show herself?2 
 
The current obsession of the state and media with woman in the United 
Kingdom wearing a hijab, jilbab or nikab has also led to calls to abandon the 
state-sponsored policy of multiculturalism. In France the debate has been 
centred on the secular character of the Republic, the principle of laïcité, the 
separation of religion and the state. In both cases the prevailing concerns are 
the absorption or integration of `minority cultures' in order to produce some 
elusive notion of social cohesion, and to disrupt apparently oppressive 
practices. The claim that multiculturalism and feminism are inconsistent is 
not new.3 `Culture' is now the cipher for speaking about people and practices 
that were racialized in earlier times. To question `culture' and thus multi- 
culturalism is the new way to speak about the `difference' of Europe's others 
- especially at a time when Islam and `terror' have been given a spurious 
equivalence. `Multiculturalism' was itself a liberal attempt to pluralize the 
concept of equality - to `respect difference', `tolerate' heterogeneity of 
social and cultural practices, and value a diversity of life worlds.4 But the 
`culture' and religion of the occident's archetypical other is being re-branded 
- Islam is once again a threat to the democratic value of equal liberty for all, 
despite the suicide of liberality contained in such discursive and govern- 
mental strategies to limit religious practices. 
 
The veiled woman troubles feminism and secularism in much the same 
way. Both feminism and secularism face a problem of finding a consistent 
position that respects individual autonomy, and simultaneously sustains a 
 
Harman, minister in the Department of Constitutional Affairs, called for an end to the 
nikab `because I want women to be fully included. If you want equality, you have to be 
in society, not hidden away from it'. Creating a timely distraction from the disasters in 
Iraq, Jack Straw initiated the furore when he asked a constituent (not a term to be taken 
literally any longer) that she should remove her nikab as he `felt uncomfortable'. Prime 
Minister Blair intervened later stating that the nikab was a `mark of separation' that 
makes others `from outside of the community feel uncomfortable'. See Kristianasen's 
detailed contextualization of how the veil became a weighty matter of state. 
2 Badiou, id. 
3 See S.M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999). 
4 There have, of course, been powerful and persuasive critiques of multiculturalism, 
see, especially, H. Bannerji, Thinking Through: Essays on Feminism, Marxism and 
Anti-Racism (1995); and The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, 
Nationalism and Gender (2000). 
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conception of politics freed from heteronomous determination. In making 
this argument, this article takes much of its conceptual inspiration from the 
essay by Jean-Luc Nancy contained in this volume. As Nancy characterizes 
the problem: 
 
So everything happens as if the great alternative of modernity had been: either 
definitively emancipate politics so that it is entirely separate from religion, or 
expel them both, outside the effectivity and seriousness of the autoproduction 
of humanity. So either politics is conceived as the effectivity of autonomy 
(personal as well as collective), or politics and religion together are repre- 
sented as heteronomous, and autonomy consists in freeing oneself from them. 
Resistance of the political to the religious or resistance to the politico-religious 
(and in this case, resistance of what, of whom? Let us leave this question in 
suspense).5 
 
Inspired by this line of questioning, this article will seek to do two things: 
first, attempt to give an answer to what is being resisted and by whom in 
modes of politics which seek to produce an autonomous subject emancipated 
from `other laws' (heteronomy). Second, it will consider what has been 
termed the problem of Islam in Europe as a wider juridical and political 
problem centred on the significance of affect as heteronomy. That is, it will 
explore the important tension between piety and the polity. But let us first 
consider some examples of how the problem of autonomy and heteronomy 
are presented in juridical and political discourse. 
 
There is by now high judicial authority, in Europe and the United 
Kingdom, for governmental limits on religious dress. The Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Leyla SÎahin v. Turkey6 endorsed a 
version of secularism that saw the ban on the `Islamic headscarf' (the hijab) 
as a condition for maintaining the `revolutionary values' that underpin the 
Republic of Turkey, and thus for guaranteeing equality, liberty, and 
democracy.7 The prohibition on wearing the hijab by Leyla SÎ ahin, a medical 
student at Istanbul University, was found to be a justifiable and proportionate 
means of dealing with a threat to `public order' and for protecting the rights 
and freedoms of others. The Grand Chamber endorsed the following 
statement from the Chamber judgment of June 2004: 
 
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political 
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their 
religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts 
. . . It has previously said that each Contracting State may, in accordance with 
the Convention provisions, take a stance against such political movements, 
based on its historical experience . . . The regulations concerned have to be 
viewed in that context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the 
 
5 J.-L. Nancy, `Church, State, Resistance' in this Special Issue, (2007) 34 Journal of 
Law and Society 3-13, at 7. 
6 Leyla SÎahin v. Turkey (Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, 10 November 2005); see, also, Dahlab v. Switzerland (Application no. 
42393/98, 15 February 2001). 
7 See SÎahin, id., para. 39. 
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legitimate aims referred to above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the 
university.8 
 
This assessment equates the hijab and other forms of Islamic dress with 
`extremism', and with political movements that threaten the secular charac- 
ter of the Republic of Turkey. With the vulnerability of the secular state in 
mind, the following account of secularism was endorsed by the Grand 
Chamber: 
 
Secularism is the civil organiser of political, social and cultural life, based on 
national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. Secularism is the 
principle which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or her own 
personality through freedom of thought and which, by the distinction it makes 
between politics and religious beliefs, renders freedom of conscience and 
religion effective. In societies based on religion, which function with religious 
thought and religious rules, political organisation is religious in character. In a 
secular regime, religion is shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the 
authorities and remains in its respectable place, to be determined by the 
conscience of each and everyone.9 
 
The defence of the principle of secularism as distinct from state authority 
based on religious values is central to the judgment of the Grand Chamber, 
and to the wider disavowal of Islamic dress in the United Kingdom, France, 
the Netherlands, and Germany.10 We see in this formulation of secularism a 
direct opposition asserted between a politics of individual autonomy and 
theocratic political organization. It is precisely this distinction between 
secular and religious order that I will challenge in this article. 
Secularism has not been the key ground for limiting Islamic dress in the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom cannot lay claim to being a secular 
state - and the fact that liberty, equality, and pluralism have nonetheless 
flourished in this non-secular state was not a matter that interrupted the 
reasoning of the Grand Chamber in Şahin when it elevated secularism with 
such confidence. But the United Kingdom courts have also ruled on the 
(in)appropriateness of religious dress, most recently in R (Begum) v. 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School.11 
 
8 id., para. 115, the Grand Chamber citing the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in SÎahin with approval. 
9 id., para. 39, decision of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, published in the Official 
Gazette, 5 July 1989, endorsed by the Grand Chamber at para. 115. 
10 For an overview of the variety of reactions to Islamic dress in Europe, see T. Modood 
et al. (eds.), Multiculturalism, Muslims, and Citizenship: A European Approach 
(2006). 
11 R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
The dispute was between Shabina Begum, a minor of nearly 14 years when the 
dispute began, and Denbigh High School in Luton. The School prevented Shabina 
Begum from wearing the jilbab when she attended school, but denied that it had 
excluded her from the School. She was, according to the School, asked to conform to 
a `uniform policy' (wear the shalwar kameeze and/or other forms of dress including a 
hijab) which had been drawn up, the School claimed, in a manner sensitive to Muslim 
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The grand revolutionary ideals of a secular state are absent from the 
character of the tension between autonomy and heteronomy in the United 
Kingdom. Instead, women's equality, freedom of religious practice, social 
harmony, and unity and public order have featured in the reasoning of the 
courts. In Begum it was a school uniform policy which permitted the hijab but 
prohibited the jilbab that was in issue. The majority of judges in the House of 
Lords concluded that Miss Begum's right to manifest her religion (guaranteed 
by Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)) was not 
infringed as she and her family had chosen that she attend this school 
knowing full well that there were limits on school uniform. The majority also 
concluded that if her Article 9 right was infringed, there was a justifiable and 
proportionate limitation of her right authorized by Article 9(2) of the ECHR. 
The limits on school uniform were also judged to have been arrived at with 
extensive and adequate consultation in a plural society - the Imams had been 
consulted!12 At stake, then, was the limitation of religious freedom and the 
extent to which this is consistent with a plural democratic polity. 
 
The decision of Baroness Hale in Begum is of particular significance for 
the objectives of this article. That is because it so palpably struggles with the 
tension between autonomy and heteronomy. Thus individual autonomy is 
pitted against democracy (as multicultural social cohesion), and feminist 
arguments that both support girls who veil and eschew the practice are 
considered. The reasons given by Baroness Hale for approving the school's 
uniform policy include consideration of the individual choice of women,13 
women's equality,14 the complex agency of Muslim girls in Europe,15 the 
 
girls and their religious beliefs, and after wide consultation. Shabina Begum argued 
that she had been excluded, and had thus been denied her Art. 9 right and freedom 
under the European Convention on Human Rights to manifest her religious belief. 
She also contended that she has been denied her right to education, but this was not 
pursued later on appeal. Once Art. 9 is engaged, and not all Lord Justices agreed that 
it was, the question was whether the interference was justified and necessary in a 
democratic society. The majority of the House of Lords concluded that there had been 
no interference with the right in Art. 9 to manifest the practices and observances of 
Shabina Begum's religious beliefs. Lord Bingham sets out the most comprehensive 
account of this position. Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale stated that there was an 
interference with Begum's Art. 9 rights, but argued that the interference was justified. 
12 See the judgment of Lord Bingham, id., at para. 34; and Lord Foscote, id., paras. 75-7. 
13 id., para. 96: `If a woman freely chooses to adopt a way of life for herself, it is not for 
others, including other women who have chosen differently, to criticise or prevent 
her'. 
14 id., para. 95: `A dress code which requires women to conceal all but their face and 
hands, while leaving men much freer to decide what they will wear, does not treat 
them equally'. 
15 id., para. 94: citing Bhikhu Parekh's rebuttal of Susan Moller Okin in `A Varied 
Moral World, A Response to Susan Okin's ``Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women''' 
Boston Review, October/November 1997. Parekh wrote: 
In France and the Netherlands several Muslim girls freely wore the hijab 
(headscarf), partly to reassure their conservative parents that they would not be 
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limited cognitive capacities of a child,16 and then beyond the individual, the 
social cohesion that a school might foster.17 Drawing on the dissenting 
judgment of Judge Tulkens in SÎahin, Baroness Hale agreed that there should 
not be limits placed on an adult's individual autonomy to choose how reli- 
gious belief would be manifested. But in the case of a child, such limits were 
said to be justified, particularly when a school was successfully imple- 
menting a policy that was aimed at creating the conditions for social 
cohesion. 
 
At the heart of Baroness Hale's reasoning is an extremely limited notion 
of what it means for an individual to have autonomous agency (`formal 
operational thought') - and this despite the fact that she acknowledges the 
complexity of agentive decisions on veiling by girls and women.18 More- 
over, it features the elevation of the unity of the community - the com- 
monality and cohesion produced by the school - over the complex concerns 
that inform the decisions of young women to `veil'. It thus exposes how the 
exigencies of sustaining a particular formation of the political - the cohesive 
multicultural state - are dressed up as a defence of individual autonomy, or 
the protection of vulnerable girls. The production of a cohesive nation has to 
negotiate tensions between autonomy, democracy, secularism, and religion. 
It is precisely the relation between these phenomena that I explore here. 
 
What, then, is the relation between autonomy, democracy, secularism, and 
religion? As we have seen, the equal liberty of the individual to practice her 
 
corrupted by the public culture of the school, and partly to reshape the latter by 
indicating to white boys how they wished to be treated. The hijab in their case was 
a highly complex autonomous act intended to use the resources of the tradition 
both to change and to preserve it. 
16 id., para. 93: 
Important physical, cognitive and psychological developments take place during 
adolescence. Adolescence begins with the onset of puberty; from puberty to 
adulthood, the `capacity to acquire and utilise knowledge reaches its peak 
efficiency'; and the capacity for formal operational thought is the forerunner to 
developing the capacity to make autonomous moral judgments. Obviously, these 
developments happen at different times and at different rates for different people. 
But it is not at all surprising to find adolescents making different moral judgments 
from those of their parents. It is part of growing up. The fact that they are not yet 
fully adult may help to justify interference with the choices they have made. It 
cannot be assumed, as it can with adults, that these choices are the product of a 
fully developed individual autonomy. 
17 id., para. 98: 
Social cohesion is promoted by the uniform elements of shirt, tie and jumper, and 
the requirement that all outer garments be in the school colour. But cultural and 
religious diversity is respected by allowing girls to wear either a skirt, trousers, or 
the shalwar kameez, and by allowing those who wished to do so to wear the hijab. 
This was indeed a thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the 
complexities of the situation. This is demonstrated by the fact that girls have 
subsequently expressed their concern that if the jilbab were to be allowed they 
would face pressure to adopt it even though they do not wish to do so. 
18 See Parekh, op. cit., n. 15. 
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religion, or to engage in social or cultural practices (though the practice of 
`veiling' cannot be reduced to that), has been opposed to civility, the 
emancipation of women, the defeat of Islamic fundamentalism, and the 
physical and psychological health of children. While the obvious conclusion 
to draw from all this would be that the `sacred' is being unequivocally 
expelled in order to sustain some other basis of commonality, in this paper I 
argue that much more is at stake. The controversy in relation to Islamic 
dress, and more widely, the place of Islam in Europe, is an apt context in 
which to explore how formations of the `sacred' mediate what is `common' 
in secular political community. The contemporary crisis of liberal demo- 
cracy stems, I wish to argue, from the inability to sustain a political 
formation either by monistic authority (of God, monarch, or its modern 
variation as `people'), or by the various hetero-nomic formations of political 
community determined by history (class and labour), religion, culture, or 
ethno-nationality. Even the cosmopolitan polity buckles under the weight of 
the exigencies of `necessity' which regulate the application of human rights. 
 
Nearly all human rights enunciated in post-Second World War charters and 
conventions (following the model of the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen 1789) subject such rights to limitations `prescribed by law' 
and `necessary in a democratic society'. That is to say, the violence that 
might legitimately be deployed in the name of sovereignty and community 
has multiplied in the age of human rights, and in a manner that specifically 
destroys the very liberties and autonomies purportedly founded and 
protected by such extreme measures. `Democracy' is now invoked in order 
to legitimate violations of individual freedom and liberty, and to disregard 
fundamental legal protections such as habeas corpus. We must understand 
this undermining of freedom, equality, and liberty in the name of democracy 
by way of a complex relation between autonomy and heteronomy contained 
in the concept of politics itself.19 
 
It is worth tracing some of the key modes of politics that have led to the 
oppositions we have just observed between autonomy/heteronomy, sacred/ 
profane, liberty/democracy. Much of the rhetoric about women who veil has 
centred on questions of individual autonomy, agency, social cohesion, and 
political transformation. It is therefore useful to provide a map of the 
influential discourses on political subjectivity, agency, and social transforma- 
tion. This is followed by an examination of piety and political community in 
the second part of this article. Islamic piety has posed particular challenges in 
democratic political orders. The objective here is to explore the contours of 
how piety is a problem of `polity'. How does the opposition between religion 
and democracy arise in European modernity? Is the distinction between 
sacred and secular viable? How does the relation between autonomy and 
heteronomy undo the simplistic opposition between Islam and democracy? 
 
19 I take this opposition of autonomy/heteronomy from Nancy, op. cit., n. 5. 
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Although the enlightenment and its bourgeois revolutions are not the only 
source of a `proclamation of autonomy', their inspired formulation of `no 
equality without liberty, no liberty without equality' is worth examining 
more closely.21 As Balibar argues, `equal liberty' stated in revolutionary 
terms has a logic that contains a `self-refutation of its negation'.22 It is 
logically impossible to base civil liberty on discrimination, privilege, and 
inequality just as it is not possible to institute equality by despotism, even 
`enlightened' despotism.23 This is a lesson that those who have intervened to 
save young Muslim women will do well to learn. But here the first aporia of 
autonomy also emerges to unsettle the `purity' of the formulation set out 
above. Autonomy is only possible through the unfolding of a universal- 
ization of the claim to autonomy. For instance, in the Marxist tradition, the 
demand for emancipation was articulated through the universalization `the 
people of the people', the `universal class'.24 The politics of autonomy 
which is first a negation of oppressive conditions, must then present as a 
`negation of the negation', thus becoming an absolute.25 As Balibar puts it, 
this `idealisation expresses itself in namings, creations of keywords, whose 
power to seize the imagination is all the greater for the fact that they initially 
expressed a radical negativity'.26 `People' and `proletariat' are such terms, 
and Balibar claims that `woman' and `foreigner' might be others.27 The 
unfolding of the emancipatory politics of the claim to autonomy of women, 
in its universalization as an absolute, becomes an unconditional demand that 
sweeps away any claim that does not fit with the ideal. What content will be 
given to this ideal? What conditions of women's emancipation will be made 
absolute? 
 
In the language of left progressive politics, autonomy as the unconditional 
base for an emancipatory politics turns against itself at the moment when it is 
invoked as a universal practice. The universalization of a particular political 
subjectivity appears to be, in various modern instantiations, a necessary 
condition of emancipatory politics. But the autonomy of the subject falls 
down at the frontier where it confronts the (other's) law from another place. 
 
20 E. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (2002) 1-39. I draw the three concepts of 
politics discussed in this section from Balibar's account. 
21 id., p. 2 
22 id., p. 3. 
23 id. 
24 id., p. 6. 
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For instance, consider the claim made by some feminists in relation to 
multiculturalism - particularly in the controversial debate around Susan 
Moller Okin's essay, `Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?'28 Here the 
claim is that respect for a plurality of cultural practices and normative 
frameworks can lead to normative paralysis in the face of practices that are 
harmful to women, such as polygamy, forced marriage, or genital cutting. 
But in an attempt to universalize the emancipated feminine subject, this 
feminist intervention undoes the very important negation of the abstract, 
autonomous liberal subject, exposed by an earlier feminist critique. More 
recently, Anne Phillips has presented an advance on Okin's concern, by 
suggesting that multiculturalism be emptied of `culture'. It is a gesture that 
holds on to the possibility of universally applicable norms that can regulate 
practices in particular life-worlds: 
 
We need . . . a multiculturalism without `culture': a multiculturalism that 
dispenses with the reified notions of culture that feed those stereotypes to 
which so many feminists have objected, yet retains enough robustness to 
address inequalities between cultural groups; a multiculturalism in which the 
language of cultural difference no longer gives hostages to fortune or 
sustenance to racists, but also no longer paralyses normative judgment. Those 
writing on multiculturalism (supporters as well as critics) have exaggerated not 
only the unity and solidity of cultures but also the intractability of value 
conflict, and often misrecognised highly contextual political dilemmas as if 
these reflected deep value disagreement. Though there are important areas of 
cultural disagreement, most do not involve a deep diversity in respect of 
ethical principles and norms, and many are more comparable to the disputes 
that take place within cultural groups.29 
 
What, in particular, is being negated here in the name of a feminist politics? 
There is of course a disavowal of cultural relativism and an affirmation of 
woman's agency `within' particular cultural formations. There is also recog- 
nition of cultural difference, but a refusal to accept deep incommensurability 
with regard to ethical and normative principles. Most palpable, however, is 
the sense that one is either inside or outside a cultural and political group, 
and on the dominant side of such a binary opposition is a hegemonic 
capacity (of the feminists of the majority culture) to engineer a political 
consensus about what is beneficial to oppressed women.30 On what basis can 
this political consensus be produced? This is a question that troubles all 
politics, and significantly, it leaves one wondering what is left of the demand 
for (the other's) `autonomy' at the end of this process. 
 
28 Okin, op. cit., n. 3. 
29 A. Phillips, `Multiculturalism without Culture' 4 (original emphasis), paper presented 
at conference on `Beyond Feminism v. Multiculturalism', London School of 
Economics, 17 November 2006, to be published in A. Phillips, Multiculturalism 
without Culture (2007). 
30 Later I will consider another feminist approach, by Rosi Braidotti, that eschews this 
inside/outside conception of politics and human subjectivity - but one that I argue has 
its own shortcomings. 
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We have just observed the tension between universalizing autonomy and 
producing political consensus at the same time. This is a particular problem 
when the cultural and political field is understood to be `multicultural' or 
plural - by implication containing a multiplicity of normative frameworks. 
Let's consider this problem of politics in another register, this time, one that 
places emphasis on individual agency, and transformation of the conditions 




Famously, Marx gave an account of subjects' agency as `politics under 
conditions not of their choosing'. For Marx: `human beings make there own 
history, but they do not make it arbitrarily in conditions chosen by them- 
selves, but in conditions always already given and inherited from the past'.31 
Balibar offers a persuasive account of the agency of the individual subject 
that can be derived from the `conditions of history' as the heteronomous 
condition of politics.32 Moreover, he combines this, following Foucault, with 
social and cultural structures, in order to avoid privileging structures of 
production and exchange.33 For Marx, universalizing the economic base of 
history, `man is first and foremost a labouring being'.34 Revolutionary 
politics is developed by exploiting the contradictions that might ultimately 
rupture the economic base. 
 
New social movements, including feminism, have followed a similar 
logic in arguing against patriarchy, or cultural modes of domination. The 
general pattern is to examine the material conditions of politics, exploit 
contradictions, and thus bring about transformation (there is no `outside' to 
these conditions under which human agency is practiced).35 It is a mode of 
politics which does not rely on a law from `outside' to call forth emancipa- 
tion, as we observed with the liberal politics of autonomy above. Politics is 
immanent to the conditions in which it arises. This concept of politics 
envisages a movement from material conditions, their contradiction, and 
finally the arrival of emancipatory transformation at some future point. 
This distant horizon of politics-as-transformation is compressed by 
Foucault.36 Rather than treating the conditions of politics as temporally or 
structurally distant from `transformation', Foucault set out how the `con- 
ditions of existence which are to be transformed are woven from the same 
cloth as the practices of transformation themselves'.37 Here again we see the 
 
31 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, cited in Balibar, op. cit., n. 
20, p. 8. 
32 Balibar, id., pp. 8-21. 
33 id., p. 9. 
34 id., p. 10. 
35 See discussion, id., pp. 10-12. 
36 id., p. 16. 
37 id., p. 15. 
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immanence of a politics of resistance. So for instance in his essay, `The 
Subject and Power', Foucault explained how institutions should be analysed 
from the standpoint of power relations, rather than from the perspective of 
institutions.38 The `proper relation of power' is then `an action upon an 
action', that is to say, `deeply rooted in the social nexus' rather than in social 
relations constituted and determined above society in some structure whose 
effacement lies in some revolutionary future.39 The `distance between 
conditions and transformation is reduced to a minimum'.40 The body 
becomes the ultimate referent/agent of politics, and with it, attention is 
drawn to techniques of normalization. Where for Marx liberty was the 
horizon of revolutionary politics, for Foucault politics is contingent on power 
relations which entail `resistance'.41 This is why Foucault urged that political 
actions should be thought of as `strategies' which are ultimately directed 
within the self - that is, as technologies of the self which train bodies. What 
we have here, then, are two modes of conceiving a politics of transformation: 
the Marxist notion of emancipation as `world historical change brought 
about by a universal class' or an analysis of power relations with respect to 
the singular being whose resistances in the mode of an `action upon an 
action' brings about transformations in the conditions of individual 
existence. 
 
Returning to the question of politics in the context of veiling in European 
liberal democracies, we should be cautious about making trite equations 
between resistant practices and the complex reasons attached to why girls 
and women may decide to `veil'. Nonetheless, there is no shortage of 
evidence that veiling may well be seen as a form of resistance, `an action 
upon an action', and not merely the crude absorption of a docile subject in a 
theocratic and patriarchal order.42 This should cause concern for those who 
wish to produce social consensus from above as a means of liberating the 
oppressed woman. Moreover, the ease with which the judiciary has 
internalized threats by `fundamentalists' and `extremists' should give no 
comfort when feminist concerns are appropriated for the production of social 
cohesion, such as in the Begum case. In Şahin and Begum, the individual 
subject whose freedom was apparently at issue is left to confront yet another 
governmental and biopolitical action against her body. Autonomy and 
 
38 M. Foucault, `The Subject and Power' in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, eds. H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (1982), cited in Balibar, id., pp. 14- 
15. 
39 Balibar, id., p. 14. 
40 id., p. 15. 
41 id., p. 17. 
42 In particular, see my discussion of S. Mahmood's study of women's Mosque 
movements at pp. 153-5 below. See, also, Kristianasen, op. cit., n. 1; T. Asad, `Trying 
to Understand French Secularism' in Political Theologies, ed. H. de Vries (2006); D. 
Lyon and D. Spini, `Unveiling the Headscarf Debate' (2004) 12 Feminist Legal 
Studies 333-45, at 339-44; and Baroness Hale in Begum, op. cit., n. 15. 
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heteronomy cannot simply be opposed to each other. The desire and agency 
of the subject is conditioned by heteronomy, but not overdetermined by it. 
To the modes of politics and related conceptions of the individual subject 
we have been considering, a third must be added. This is inspired by 
Spinoza, and developed by Deleuze and Guattari, and feminist philosophers 
influenced by their thought.43 
 
3. Becoming minority 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, following Spinoza, elements do not have a 
particular form or function.44 An element is distinguished by movement and 
rest, slowness and speed: 
 
Thus each individual is an infinite multiplicity, and the whole of Nature is a 
multiplicity of perfectly individuated multiplicities. The plane of consistency 
of Nature is like an immense Abstract Machine . . . [I]ts pieces are the various 
assemblages each of which groups together an infinity of particles entering 
into an infinity of more or less interconnected relations.45 
 
Individuation, which is only distinguished by movement, rest, slowness, and 
speed, takes place on a `plane of immanence'.46 In this plane of immanence, 
the individual is never fixed, that is to say, it is always in a process of 
becoming: 
 
To the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there 
correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or diminishing its power to 
act; these intensities come from external parts or from the individual's own 
parts. Affects are becomings. Spinoza asks: What can a body do?47 
 
The body is capable of affects within a given degree of power. Rather than 
defining the body through species or genus, Deleuze and Guattari state that 
we should try to count its affects.48 Through affects, bodies can jointly 
compose a more powerful body, or destroy each other. 
 
From this conceptualization of individuation - that is, bodies as multi- 
plicitous desiring assemblages, Deleuze and Guattari proposed a notion of 
identity as `territoriality'. This notion of identity as territoriality is especially 
pertinent to a discussion of veiling where women's bodies are territorialized 
as the site at which a political dispute about autonomy/heteronomy, 
 
43 B. Spinoza, Ethics (2000); G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987); and see M. Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, 
Power and Corporeality (1996); M. Gatens and G. Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: 
Spinoza, Past and Present (1999); G. Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics (1996); A. Negri, 
The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics (1991); and 
R. Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics (2006). 
44 Deleuze and Guattari, id., p. 253. 
45 id., p. 254. 
46 id. 
47 id., p. 256. 
48 id., p. 257. 
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secularism and laïcité take place. These territorialities/identities are either 
`majoritarian' or `minoritarian' - both expressing different modes of `desire 
for otherness'.49 `Desire for otherness' involves two modes of being the 
`fascinated self' - either desiring that the other remain other, or expressing a 
fascination for becoming other.50 These modes of desire (and territorialities) 
are means of constituting collectivities that arise in a universal schema of 
majoritarian identity: `a punctual system comprising five points: Man 
(central point), male (dominant point), adult (dominant point), woman, 
child'.51 This notion of the `majority' in Deleuze and Guattari's formulation 
is universal and without geopolitical or historical specificity.52 As Goulimari 
explains, from the point of view of feminism, this majoritarian schema of 
identity provides `a ready-made referent or political constituency, ``woman'' 
- in spite of her diversity and multiplicity'.53 To the extent that feminism 
relies on this referent as the subjectivity in relation to which its claims are 
based, it corroborates the majoritarian schema of identity. What many 
feminists including Goulimari call for is a minoritarian feminism - a mode of 
becoming minority - that emphasizes the `desire of becoming other' which 
builds `lines of flight' or `lines of escape' from the majoritarian schema.54 I 
should emphasize that this is not about majority/minority as it is used in 
discussions about `multiculturalism'.55 It is rather about the concept 
`woman' as a territoriality, and requires further explanation. 
 
For feminists like Luce Irigaray who use the concept `woman' as a 
`strategic essentialism', woman is a referent for `female sexed being', a 
being capable of building alliances across `boundaries' of age, race, class, 
and sexual orientation.56 In relation to political subjectivity, the Deleuzian 
and Guattarian schema poses an immediate dilemma for feminists who wish 
to hold on to the category `woman' as a `strategic essentialism' which 
grounds a politics of difference upon which they base a reformist agenda. 
Luce Irigaray advocates such an essentialism (`woman'), as does Rosi 
Braidotti: ```being-a-woman'' is always already there as the ontological 
 
49 P. Goulimari, `A Minoritarian Feminism? Things to do with Deleuze and Guattari' 






55 Feminist theory has attempted to take seriously the conundrum of imposing a feminist 
normativity on so called `minority women' who are thus by definition `outside' what 
is set out as a feminist emancipatory trajectory. A good summary of how feminism 
grapples with the rather problematic category of the `minority woman' can be found 
in M. Malik, ```The Branch on which we sit'': Multiculturalism, Minority Women and 
Family Law' in Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, eds. A. Diduck and K. 
O'Donovan (2007, forthcoming). 
56 See discussion of Irigaray and Braidotti in Goulimari, op. cit., n. 49, p. 106. 
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precondition'.57 As Goulimari argues, the problem in Deleuze and Guattari's 
terms is that: 
 
Strategic essentialism turns `being a woman' into an artificial territoriality for 
feminism, thereby simultaneously turning race, age, and sexual preference into 
subdivisions, into subterritorialities of `being-a-woman', with the result that it 
purports to be necessary for alliances across boundaries and between 
subterritorialities that it has constructed in the first place.58 
 
The artificial territory, such as `woman', involves processes of `segregation' 
that are `majoritarian'. For Deleuze and Guattari, the processes of artificial 
territorialization are omnipresent, and there is no point in trying to label them 
as bad or good.59 The objective, rather, is to constitute a mode of `becoming 
minoritarian' - that is, to create a `nomadic' identity/territoriality.60 
Rosi Braidotti, Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd, and Antonio Negri have 
all drawn on Deleuze and Guattari to build a conception of human subjects 
as individuated `bodies', differentiated parts of nature, but without essence.61 
For these bodies, freedom is tied to reason, but also shaped by environment 
and social organization. These `nomadic subjectivities are defined in terms 
of processes of becoming'.62 The desire of the individuated subject is 
capable of affective force and `being together' - but a `being together' which 
is radically `post-human', that is to say, non-anthropocentric. Rosi Braidotti 
has put it like this: 
 
`we' are in this together. What this refers to is the cartography as a cluster of 
interconnected problems that touches the structure of subjectivity and the very 
possibility of the future as a sustainable option. `We' are in this together, in 
fact, enlarges the sense of collectively bound subjectivity to nonhuman agents, 
from our genetic neighbours the animals, to the earth as a bio-sphere as a 
whole . . . How to do justice to this relatively simple yet highly problematic 
reality requires a shift of perspective. As Haraway suggests, we need to work 
towards `a new techno-scientific democracy'.63 
 
This `post-human' mode of nomadic politics raises and addresses many 
important contemporary concerns, although its generality and abstraction 
conveniently elides some more conventionally territorialized bodies. Given 
the affinity of Deleuze and Guattari with Marx and Foucault, one is left to 
ponder the many connections between the politics of the nomad and the 
earlier concerns of politics as autonomy and heteronomy. 
 
57 R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory (1994) 187, cited in Goulimari, id., p. 106. 
58 Goulimari, id. 
59 id., p. 110. 
60 id. 
61 Braidotti, op. cit., Gatens, op. cit., Lloyd, op. cit., Negri, op. cit., all in n. 43. 
62 Braidotti, id., p. 148. 
63 R. Braidotti, `Affirming the Affirmative: on Nomadic Affectivity' (2006) 11 
Rhizomes para. 28, at <http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/braidotti.html> - access 
verified 22 November 2006. 
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More specifically, what would it mean for a woman to speak in her own 
name, and be a desiring body that is a mere assemblage of affective forces 
oriented towards a minoritarian line of flight? Is autonomy obsolete when 
being-a-nomad is a condition of infinite multiplicity? Is the agentive subject 
redundant when the body is an affective assemblage? This is not the place to 
develop the responses that are available to these important questions. What 
we can take away from this discussion of modes of politics is that it is by no 
means adequate to pursue questions of equality and freedom, or religious and 
political life, as they have been dealt with by some liberal feminists or 
theorists of multiculturalism. Nor is it adequate to separate the child from the 
adult, the believer from the extremist, the democrat from the fundamentalist 
- simplistic oppositions that judges of the United Kingdom and European 
Courts have found to be expedient. 
 
The Western popular media regularly assert that `Muslim women are 
incomparably bound by the unbreakable chains of religious and patriarchal 
oppression'.64 However, more informed research would suggest that conduct 
that follows strict adherence to some Islamic teachings cannot simply be 
rendered as a rejection of liberal pluralism, secularization, and modernization. 
As Mahmood has argued, feminist scholarship on the subjectivity of Muslim 
women has paralleled the New Left rejection of the classical Marxist 
formulation that the peasantry has no agency and thus no place in the making of 
modern history (the Subaltern Studies Project).65 The Muslim woman has thus 
been reunited with her agency, but this important intervention by feminists is 
also attended by some problems. Most significantly, a feminist consciousness 
about gendered subjectivity, as we have seen, has tended to focus on the agency 
of an `autonomous subject' whose actions can be universally mapped onto a 
terrain of repression and resistance.66 Feminists have of course sought to depart 
from a liberal notion of individual autonomy by providing an account of 
woman's agency as embodied, relational, and socially embedded. Post- 
structural feminists have described how subjects performatively transgress 
norms by resignifying or subverting them. And as we have just seen, feminists 
inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, call into question the very existence of a 
unitary subject condemned to oppressive stasis. For these latter theorists, 
nomadic-being is a multiplicity of affective relations in constant movement. 
 
Hence, there are by now many familiar accounts of understanding `resistance' 
to modes of normalization. But Mahmood asks whether this attention to norms 
as either consolidated or subverted by subjects does not ignore the fact that 
(religious) norms are also inhabited and experienced in a variety of ways.67 
 
64 S. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2005) 
6-7. 
65 id. 
66 id., pp. 7, 14. Mahmood discusses the celebrated work of Lila Abu-Lughod, and the 
latter's own reflections on the need to depart from the binary of repression/resistance. 
67 id., pp. 9, 22. 
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Importantly, Mahmood questions whether: 
 
it is even possible to identify a universal category of acts - such as those of 
resistance - outside of the ethical and political conditions within which such 
acts acquire their particular meaning. Equally important is the question that 
follows: does the category of resistance impose a teleology of progressive 
politics on the analytics of power - a teleology that makes it hard for us to see 
and understand forms of being and action that are not necessarily encapsulated 
by the narrative of subversion and reinscription of norms?68 
 
Mahmood's answer to the need to avoid such a teleology of politics through 
analytics of power is to focus on the agency of the subject, for instance, in 
women's mosque movements. To cut a rather long and interesting story 
short, what Mahmood finds in the Egyptian women's mosque movements is 
a turn to religion precisely in order to resist the wider secularization of 
society that is regarded as dissolving the family, and other sources of social 
and cultural practices. The mosque movement is thus about new structures of 
learning that will generate an ethos that was previously sustained by family 
and society. In what follows I want to focus on the affect of community that 
is at the heart of the tension between religion and democracy. This is one 
way to juxtapose practices of religious piety with modes of subjection in 
political community. 
 
PIETY AND POLITY 
 
Wearing the hijab and other forms of Islamic dress has been infused with the 
power to undermine multiculturalism, liberal notions of equality, individual 
autonomy, and the secular state.69 For most liberals, particularly of the 
muscular kind, the hijab is a sign of women's oppressive absorption in 
`culture', and an intrusion of religion into the public sphere. This is 
apparently anathema to the modern conception of political life. In Turkey, as 
we observed above, the hijab has been associated with Islamic extremism 
and fundamentalism, and in the United Kingdom we observed how the jilbab 
and nikab have been associated with stifling the `proper' development of a 
child, or being a symbol of separation and unacceptable difference. Saba 
Mahmood has pointed out how the question of women's `piety' discussed in 
such disputes is always already a question of `polity'.70 In her book, Politics 
of Piety, she sets out the debates among Islamic scholars and activists in 
Egypt regarding whether religious piety should principally be about worship, 
ritual, and an entire mode of being (the version from the pious adherents of 
Islam), or a platform for a wider social and political project which has as its 
horizons `truth, justice and freedom' (this is the view of people who eschew 
 
68 id., p. 9. 
69 See n. 1. 
70 Mahmood, op. cit., n. 64, p. 53. 
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`religiosity', and want a wider dialogue about Islam and social change).71 
The cultivation of the living body as virtuous through its capacities to be 
constrained, limited, endure fasting and pain, punishment and even 
martyrdom, are common features of many religions, not least Christianity. 
In modernity these practices present a tension between individual autonomy 
(in the form of individual choice of religious practice) and heteronomy 
(being subject to a different, external law). 
 
1. Autonomy and heteronomy 
 
The tension between autonomy and heteronomy is especially troubling for 
democratic orders - and in two senses. First there is the obvious tension 
between the secular and the religious. Liberal democratic orders elevate the 
autonomous individual above the constraints of communitarian determina- 
tions, including the external (transcendent) law of religion. On this account 
Islamic dress is negated to protect a system of individual autonomies, 
including that of the apparently `vulnerable' woman. But there is a second 
tension - this time between heteronomy and democracy itself. The individual 
right to freedom of religious practice contradicts the `civil religion' of the 
secular state. In light of this, the seemingly obvious oppositions between 
sacred and profane, secular and religious, come unstuck.72 Heteronomy is 
thus not only the transcendent, deific authority of conventional religion, but 
also the `civil religion' of `stable nations' and the patriotic fervour that is 
modernity's answer to what holds together our `being-with' each other.73 
The problem of Islam in Europe is in that sense not just a clash between the 
enlightenment's self-legislating, autonomous individual and the religion to 
which she belongs, but is in fact a clash between which external law, of God 
or nation-state, will determine individual and collective practice. 
 
The problem of Islam in Europe (as with Christianity in the United States) 
is that it has given rise to a civil war of heteronomies. The war of 
heteronomies is a struggle over which law (of nation/republic or theocracy) 
will prevail. Jean-Luc Nancy has elegantly encapsulated this conundrum of 
heteronomy and the nation-state: 
 
The sovereign State is the State that must derive its legitimation from itself. 
Without even emphasizing how essential the right to decide the state of 
exception from law (according to which Schmitt defines sovereignty) is in this 
context, we have to acknowledge that autonomy, as the principle of the 
political, here makes its major demand: it must or it should in one way or 
another found, authorize, and guarantee its own law by its own means. Is this 
possible in any other way than by invoking the necessities of security born of 
the weakness and the hostility of men? But can such necessities found more 
than an expedient - or even, in some cases, more than a usurped authority for 
 
71 id., pp. 52-3. 
72 The opposition between sacred and profane is interrogated below. 
73 I will elaborate this point below with reference to J.-L. Nancy. 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Journal of Law and Society, 34 (2). pp. 138-161’ 
- 18 - 
 
 
the sole good of some? Thus we see delineated the general scheme of the 
political problematic from the classical age onwards.74 
 
How will the secular democratic state guarantee its own law by its own 
means? Have we not seen how questions of security (extremism and funda- 
mentalism) operate as the expedient which mediates authority for the good 
of some? The SÎahin case, for instance, highlights how liberal democracies 
contain what Jacques Derrida has called an auto-immune process, a capacity 
to self-destruct in the name of self-preservation.75 
 
Demo-cracy, literally the rule of the demos, harbours several `suicidal' 
possibilities. By giving over to the rule of the many, to rule by `number', by a 
process of counting, a majority can come to power that can destroy all that 
democracy appears to stand for: the equal worth of each person (which of 
course is another form of counting, of being included or excluded), and the 
many freedoms of speech, association, or political organization with which 
democracy is associated.76 In Turkey, an Islamic revival `threatened' the 
secular Republic (and more specifically the reliability of a NATO ally 
crucially poised with a Euro-American geo-political orientation in the Middle 
East), and so the state responded by delimiting one of the very freedoms for 
which democracy stands by prohibiting the hijab in public institutions. This is 
one example of the auto-immunity or suicidal tendency in democracy. 
There is a more direct `suicide' which is a double appellation when the 
result of the counting for which demo-cracy stands yields a governing 
authority that is hostile to what has been called democracy.77 Derrida gives 
the example of the Algerian election of 1992, when the state interrupted the 
electoral process in order to prevent an Islamic or Islamist group gaining 
power by democratic means - that is, by obtaining the support of the 
majority of eligible voters. The interruption of the electoral process was in 
the name of democracy, but also against the coming to power of Islamic 
groups that would introduce another law for the political community. The 
interruption of the election was decided in a sovereign fashion by the state 
because it held the view that a democratically elected Islamist organization 
would alter the constitution, and thus by democratic means, `de-democratize' 
the political and juridical order. The interruption of the election was the 
suicidal immunization of democracy. It was a destruction of democracy in 
the name of its preservation. An obvious question, then, is whether what is 
called `democracy' is much more than a process of counting - more than the 
rule (cracy) of the demos? The auto-immunity of democracy exposes the 
 
74 Nancy, op. cit., n. 5, p. 9 (original emphasis). 
75 J. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005) 35; but for a fuller account of the 
politics of friendship and fraternity that harbours this destruction, see J. Derrida, 
Politics of Friendship (1997); and for an excellent commentary see A.J.P. Thomson, 
Deconstruction and Democracy (2005). 
76 Derrida, id. (2005), p. 30. 
77 id., p. 33. 
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deep conundrum of `guaranteeing your own law by your own means' 
highlighted by Nancy above. In this process, democracy turns in on itself, 
turns against itself. 
 
These observations about the auto-immune processes of democracy are also 
pertinent to the election of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority elections in 
January 2006. This was a democratic electoral victory decried by western 
powers. Though the formation of a government by Hamas could not be 
prevented precisely because of their democratic mandate, Europe, the United 
States, and several other countries suspended financial aid and continue to 
insist that specific policies be adopted by the Hamas-led government before 
further `recognition' of that power (kratos) of the people (demos) is given its 
due - the status of legitimate rule.78 The unique feature in the Turkish, 
Algerian, and Palestinian examples is that Islam, in its many variations, has 
come to be regarded as `resisting' what is being called the democratic principle 
- even though, in actual fact, the `necessities born of expedience' (Nancy) are 
usurping democratic legitimacy. These examples yield an urgent and pressing 
conjunction of the `demographic' (piety) and the `democratic' (polity).79 
 
We can now distil a general problematic that will be taken up in more 
detail here. The question is whether the `political', the polity, can be con- 
ceived in a manner that resists both heteronomy (which clings to a 
transcendent source of law), and auto-nomy (a source of law which collapses 
under the weight of the many critiques of the atomistic liberal subject)? 
What is the permissible relation between the cohering affect of a certain 
demographic (such as a Muslim community) and democracy (the counting of 
each individual-as-one)?80 This is a problem that has been posed in so-called 
`multicultural societies' where the minority's attachment to the affect of 
community (usually centred around religion or culture) is opposed to the 
majority's apparently secularized citizenship. Again what is at stake (as with 
the Turkish example), I will argue, is one heteronomous determination 
verses another - the civil war of heteronomies. What we must consider is 
what these questions about affect reveal about the limits of secular 
formations of the political as they have hitherto been conceived. 
 
Let me begin to approach these questions by elaborating how the principle 
of autonomy in liberal democracy surrenders to the heteronomous exigencies 
of the secular state. This will permit a refinement of how autonomy and 
heteronomy mutually undermine the expulsion of the `sacred' from the 
political order. It will also set up an interrogation of the unsustainable 
opposition between democracy and theocracy which is so central to the 
interrogation of secular modernity and for considering the affect of religion 
in democratic political community. 
 
78 See `U.S. to Cancel $240m in aid over Hamas government' Times, 8 April 2006. 
79 See discussion at pp. 154-5 above. 
80 This is a problematic developed by Nancy in `Church, State, Resistance' (op. cit, n. 
5), and I will provide an account of his insights below. 
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2. Secular theology and the institution of democracy 
 
The perception of `Islam' is that it presents sharp contrasts and acute 
tensions with liberal values and respect for human rights. The `Rushdie 
affair' or the controversy surrounding the recent publication of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Muhammad are yet more examples of what is depicted 
as a challenge to `Europe's modernity' from religious extremists, usually 
Europe's others, caught in their regular stasis of culture and tradition. 
Moreover, the struggle between theocracy and democracy is being posed 
through a discourse of human rights. The question of Islam in Europe, and 
especially in the United Kingdom, is a telling site for considering the 
problem of the sacred in modern political and juridical formations. 
 
In what sense is the `sacred' opposed to democracy in conventional 
rhetoric? To address this question we must have at least a working definition 
of the `sacred'. The `sacred' is more usually than not opposed to the 
`profane', but that opposition is itself a product of the modes of classification 
particular to developments in anthropology and sociology in the nineteenth 
century.81 An essential feature of the sacred is that it pertains to what is `set 
apart' from the profane. The opposition between sacred and profane is 
determined by the essential character of this setting apart. This is a distinctly 
modern phenomenon according to Talal Asad, and can be contrasted with the 
opposition in medieval theology of divine/satanic (both transcendent powers) 
or spiritual/temporal (both worldly institutions).82 Durkheim's Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life, for instance, presented `all known religious beliefs' 
through a classification that could be reduced to two opposed groups or terms, 
the `sacred' and `profane'.83 The sacred in modernity, then, is an external 
transcendent power or authority which is supposedly universally opposed to 
the worldly or profane. 
 
Closer scrutiny reveals that the distinction between the sacred and profane 
is a conceptual mess compiled on contradictions. The `sacred' has a very 
different inflection in the Christianity of early modernity where not all that is 
sacred is set apart. An object, person, institution, vessel, or the body and 
office of the King (who famously has two bodies), is not set apart and yet is 
called sacred.84 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
speaks of various rights, such as property, as sacred. Defying the opposition 
of religious and secular, it is no less than the `sacralization' of the individual 
and people that marks the emergence of the secular state. This is something 
of a contradiction given the regular logic of the secular state has it that it is 
the re-presentation of individual or `people'. Individual and people must be 
 
81 See the excellent discussion in T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (2003) 30-7. 
82 id., pp. 31-2. 
83 id., p. 31. 
84 id., p. 32. 
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anything but `sacred' - they must be a source of authority that mark the 
opening of an immanent rather than a transcendent source of power.85 Some 
of the confusion which attends the opposition between sacred/profane can be 
explained through the conceptual separation of `nature', `religion', and 
`reason' that arises out of the European encounters with the colonized world. 
 
For Asad, Europe's encounter with the non-European world helps to 
explain how the `sacred' comes to be essentialized as that which is 
universally set apart from the profane.86 It was through the designation of 
practices as fetish and taboo, and the allocation of these to `Nature Folk' in 
the non-European world, that an essential separation was wrought between 
the sacred and the profane. The `sacred' became universally associated with 
religion. The cultures and traditions of the `backward peoples' of the world 
were understood as frozen in religion or myth. Europe came to be regarded 
as holding the prerogative of `profanation', the capacity to reorder society 
through `forcible emancipation from error and despotism'.87 Liberal 
democracy as it is known today is informed by these movements in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But let's be more specific about how the 
sacred continues to inhabit what is called the profane sphere of modern law, 
politics, and society. 
 
Modern law and society is structured through what can be termed onto- 
theology. Modern sovereignty, for instance, secularizes a theological concept 
of power. As Derrida has put it, sovereignty is: 
 
the concentration, into a single point of indivisible singularity (God, the 
monarch, the people, the state, or the nation-state), of absolute force and the 
absolute exception. We did not have to wait for Schmitt to learn that the 
sovereign is the one who decides exceptionally and performatively about the 
exception, the one who keeps or grants himself the right to suspend rights or 
law; nor did we need him to know that this politico-juridical concept, like all 
the others, secularises a theological heritage.88 
 
The retention of a theological heritage can be seen in numerous definitive 
texts of western modernity.89 The persistence of the sacred (or what is set 
apart) in the historico-political formation of European modernity suggests 
that this secular theology deserves more attention when considering forma- 
tions of the sacred in modern law and democracy. The secular theology of 
modernity is one explanation of why the sacred receives ambivalent 
treatment in liberal juridical orders. The sacred is at once guarded as 
 
85 This move towards immanence is also a move towards transcendence, see, generally, 
F. Dallmayr, `Postmetaphysics and Democracy' (1993) 21 Political Theory 101. 
86 Asad, op. cit, n. 81, p. 35. 
87 id. 
88 Derrida, op. cit. (2005), n. 75, pp. 153-4. 
89 For a compendious setting out of these, see P. Fitzpatrick, ` ``What Are the Gods to Us 
Now?'': Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law' (2006) 8 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 285. 
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`freedom of conscience', right to religion, or the event of sacrifice90 on 
which the political is founded and sustained, and also expelled as not proper 
to the `City', particularly in the case of what has been termed `political 
Islam'. 
 
What we must now decipher is how this problem of secular theology 
manifests the constitutive limits of liberal democracy. In brief, this is a 
question of how modern rationality is presented as the property of the 
inhabitants, all equal, who dwell in the City (as polis, Europe, western 
civilization, with their values of freedom and autonomy apparently hated by 
religious fundamentalists, and so on). To be free is to be charged with the 
freedom that is the property of equal, rational beings (all the social contract 
theories flow from this assumption). But since Charles Taylor and others 
imported a certain Hegelianism into liberal philosophy (where the com- 
munity or collective is the source of normative life-worlds), there have been 
ongoing ripples of a dispute about the source of authority. What is at stake 
here is whether the autonomous individual or the community to which she 
belongs is to be the source of authority and value. Will the self-authorizing 
autonomous individual be the sole guide of her actions, or will the 
individual's life-world be determined from another place (heteronomy)? The 
problem of secular theology in modern formations of law and society can 
thus be addressed through the tension between the autonomous individual of 
liberal demo-cracy, and the stricture of another `cracy', that of theocracy. 
 
As we have seen, Jean-Luc Nancy has recently condensed this problematic 
of secular theology into the tension between autonomy and heteronomy.91 
To recap for a moment, I have set the stage for an undoing of the 
autonomous, self-legislating individual of western modernity by showing the 
extent to which this political formation contained a constitutive tension with 
heteronomy. Now I want to explain why this is the case. Why is there a 
persistent call on transcendent deities or their substitutes (such as nation, 
people, ethnicity)? 
 
3. The affect of religion in democracy 
 
`Autonomy' is a central principle of the political in modernity. The auto- 
nomy of the individual survives among competing heteronomies of theology 
and civil religion - what was termed secular theology above. Autonomy 
cannot deliver what J.-L. Nancy has termed the `force of affect' - the 
`fervour, desire, and sentiment' that is so central to our being-with. This 
autonomy must in `one way or another found, authorize, and guarantee its 
 
90 For instance, consider J. van der Walt, Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid 
Theory of Law (2005). See his account of the inevitability of sacrifice in political 
community, in ch. 5. 
91 Nancy, op. cit, n. 5. 
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own law by its own means'.92 The modern invention of sovereignty is the 
dominant mode of answering this problem of autonomy. The State comes to 
embody the principle of `atheistic' self-sufficiency with no legitimation from 
beyond itself. The intrinsic flaw in this formulation is the need for recourse 
to `civil religion'. As Nancy points out, the separation of Church and State 
comes to rest on a principle of secularism and `fraternity'. Through frater- 
nity, and other denotations including `friendship', solidarity, responsibility, 
and even `justice' (think for instance of the various postcolonial struggles for 
independence), the `affect' of the political as an autonomous phenomenon is 
`perceptible to the hearts of citizens' (a phrase taken from Rousseau).93 As 
an order of autonomy, something in the `affect' of the political resists. It is 
this resistance in the autonomy of the political that comes to be in conflict 
with heteronomy. 
 
`Affect' is also `everyone's adhesion to community', and despite the 
secular imperative to separate this adhesion from all forms of `worship', it 
takes the form of practices of observance which celebrate values, symbols or 
signs (think of flags, Independence Day celebrations, monuments to the war- 
dead, and so on).94 The allure of the many forms of fascism, and even 
`actually existing socialism', so-called, or the current `force' of democracy 
carries the lure of this `affect', and is central to the autonomy of the political. 
Now, although `autonomy' has resisted heteronomy (through notions of 
fraternity and secularism), what is crucial for understanding the significance 
of the `sacred', and indeed piety, as a challenge to the present empire of 
democracy, is that `heteronomy resists autonomy with the force of affect'.95 
For Nancy, `affect is essentially heteronomous, and perhaps we should even 
say that affect is heteronomy'.96 Because of the `force of affect' exacted 
through Church or State, we are now facing the impossibility of a political 
institution constructed by autonomy. Autonomy fails because of the 
resistance of heteronomy. And heteronomy leads us to the disasters of 
patriotism, ethnicity, and religion. Hence the task now is to think the affect 
by which `we' co-exist, but not through a politics that collapses under the 
force of affect generated by heteronomy. How do we separate Church and 
State and be-with each other in a way that does not fall into the civil religion 
of the Republic that demands sacrifice? What law, or indeed as Nancy 
suggest, what `anomic' formation, will mutually resist autonomy and 
heteronomy?97 This is the problem that remains to be thought through. The 
problem of affect in the political will have to be the site for this labour. 
 
92 id., p. 8. 
93 id., p. 9. 
94 id., p. 10. 
95 id., p. 11. 
96 id. (original emphasis). 
97 id., p. 13. 
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The juridification of politics has turned the veiled woman into a rights- 
bearing subject whose agency is subject to what is expedient in a democratic 
society. That is the banal reality of all human rights, and we should not be 
surprised that the state will clamp down on all heteronomous formations that 
resist the civil religions of the state. The feminist veneer of juridical and 
political pronouncements about the veiled woman must not distract us from 
the real political crisis - the apparent impossibility of recovering a political 
subject that might resist the proliferation of the exception as the norm, of 
consumption as freedom, of social cohesion through ignorant vilification of 
Europe's archetypical other. The suppression of religious expression and 
piety only exposes democracy's own lack - it cannot guarantee its own law 
by its own means unless the autonomy of the political is always already 
heteronomous. For the time being we are left with `convert or perish' as 
democracy's oxymoronic cry. 
 
The subject of politics who makes her own history under conditions not of 
her choosing then appears to be left with a stark choice. Either convert to 
political formations that absorb her as a `citizen', or rely on the other 
heteronomous forms that inspire the desire and fervour of all affected beings. 
If being is singular-plural and always affected by the force of heteronomy, 
then her de-territorialization, the fact that she is a relational assemblage, is 
already part of her `becoming minority'. What will be a line of escape, a line 
of flight, from heteronomy? That is what remains to be thought. 
 
 
